Death, fear, and self-mourning by Plant, Bob
 Death, Fear, and Self-mourning 
Attitudes to our own mortality are characterized by more than just 
fear, suggests Bob Plant. 
Many philosophers (though not only philosophers) have thought that fear of death is our 
deepest, most fundamental fear.[1] On the face of it, this seems plausible. But there are 
two questions worth asking: First, is our attitude toward our own death the primary issue 
here? Second, even if we think it is the primary issue, does the prospect of one’s own 
death most commonly elicit fear? We might reasonably question the first assumption 
insofar as it underestimates—if not ignores—how others’ deaths (both human and 
animal) shape our lives, including our attitude toward our own mortality.[2] But what about 
the second assumption? Without denying that we do sometimes fear death, one might 
suspect that accepting this as a general diagnosis obscures other equally significant 
responses we have toward our own mortality. 
In addition to the two assumptions mentioned above, it is striking how many philosophers 
dismiss one very common way we think about mortality—namely, imagining ourselves 
dead. Writing in the first century BC, Lucretius explicitly cautions against the unwarranted 
self-pity such imaginings are liable to provoke.[3] More recently, Herbert Fingarette warns 
that imagining oneself dead inevitably misrepresents the situation.[4] These worries are 
not unreasonable. After all, when I try to imagine my posthumous self (when I picture my 
funeral, family and friends sorting through my belongings, emptying my office, and so 
on), I cannot avoid imagining part of myself surviving to bear witness. In other words, in 
these imaginings I always remain behind as a ‘quasi-dead’ observer.[5] But should we 
therefore reject such imaginings as inherently misleading? I am not convinced. Let me 
briefly explain why. 
By his own admission, Jacques Derrida was preoccupied with death, survival and 
associated themes.[6]Discussing his own mortality at the 1995 symposium ‘Applied 
Derrida’,[7] this is what he says: 
You can imagine that when one comes to a conference entitled ‘Applied You’, you experience 
the situation in which it is as if you were dead… [A]mongst the various reasons why on many 
occasions I do agree to attend conferences on me is because, after a lot of hesitations, a lot 
of inner contradictions, I would like to see what it looks like as if I were dead, listening and 
being among them, while not playing the pathetic role of the dead person. 
Derrida proceeds to suggest that what lies at the heart of our anxieties about death is the 
‘fantasy that we are going to be present at and in attendance at this non-world, at our 
own death’.[8] Notwithstanding the strange appeal of experiencing himself as if he was 
dead, what Derrida describes here is not wildly idiosyncratic; there is a more general 
point to be made. For better or worse, we happen to be the sort of creatures who 
imaginatively step back and view our lives from a distance, and we take this objectifying 
perspective in various contexts with varying degrees of disengagement. Experiencing 
one’s quasi-death—imagining oneself dead while remaining behind as a ghost-like 
witness—is one, perhaps the most radical, way our reflexive capacity for self-
transcendence manifests itself. 
We might now ask the following question: When I imaginatively see myself dead, what is 
it that I feel? As noted earlier, fear can certainly play a role here. However, there is 
another response that is, I think, at least as common as fear: prospective, self-
directed grief. For when I imagine (prospectively) looking over the countless traces my 
life left behind, I often find myself here and now mourning my (future) death and my 
inevitable disappearance from the ongoing commotion of life. It is in this sense, though 
not only in this sense, that we might describe ourselves as ‘constituted by a certain work 
of mourning’.[9] 
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